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Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s
performance: a two-stage quasi-experimental
approach*
Néstor Duch*, Daniel Montolioa and Mauro Mediavillab
ABSTRACT: In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of regional R&D public
programs in Catalonia (Spain) with a two-stage procedure. Firstly, we compare the
performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but un-
subsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
methodology to construct a control group which, with regard to its observable cha-
racteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to iden-
tify firms which maintain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Se-
condly, and once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the
respective performance of each firm using regression techniques. As a result, we
find that recipient firms, on average, seem to increase their value added as a direct
result of public subsidy programs.
JEL classification: H25, H32, L25, L53.
Key words: R&D policy, evaluation, firm performance, Propensity Score Matching
Evaluación del impacto de los subsidios públicos en el funcionamiento de una
empresa: una aproximación cuasi-experimental en dos etapas
RESUMEN: En este artículo se evalúa, utilizando una técnica en dos etapas, la
efectividad de los programas públicos de I+D en Cataluña (España). Primero se
comparan los resultados de las empresas subvencionadas (tratadas) con empresas si-
* Corresponding author: Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB), Faculty of Economics and Business,
University of Barcelona, Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Phone +(34) 934 02 04 14. 
Fax +(34) 934 02 18 13. E-mail: nduch@ub.edu.
a Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB), Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Barcelona,
Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain, Phone +(34) 934 03 90 80, Fax.+(34) 934 02 18 13. E-mail:
montolio@ub.edu.
b Interdisciplinary Group on Educational Policies (GIPE), Faculty of Economics and Business, University of
Barcelona, Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain, Phone +(34) 934 02 18 16, Fax. +(34) 934 02 18 13.
E-mail: mmediavilla@ub.edu.
Recibido: 3 de febrero de 2009 / Aceptado: 24 de junio de 2009.
143
06 Duch  19/11/09  12:26  Página 143milares, pero no subvencionadas (control). Se utiliza la metodología del Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) para construir un grupo de control que sea lo más parecido
posible, respecto a sus principales características, al grupo de tratamiento, que per-
mita identificar a las empresas que presentan la misma propensión a recibir subsi-
dios públicos. Segundo, una vez se ha establecido un grupo de comparación válido,
se comparan los resultados de las empresas de los diferentes grupos utilizando técni-
cas de regresión. Como resultado, se encuentra que las empresas que reciben sub-
venciones, en promedio, parecen aumentar su valor añadido como resultado directo
de los programas públicos.
Clasificación JEL: H25, H32, L25, L53.
Palabras clave: política de I+D, evaluación, resultados empresariales, Propensity
Score Matching.
1. Introduction
There seems to be little controversy about the desirability of governmental support to
R&D and technological innovation and, nowadays, most countries spend significant
amounts of money on programs intended to promote these activities. The justification
for this support comes from the correction of market failures argument which states
that social returns to R&D activities are greater than private returns making the mar-
ket allocation of these resources sub-optimal. Two main policies have been imple-
mented to solve the under-provision of innovation effort by private business: direct
involvement of governmental bodies in these activities, and incentives for an increa-
sed provision of private investment in R&D.
Concerning the latter, several instruments can be identified. There are tax incenti-
ves that reduce the marginal cost of R&D for all firms performing such activities so
there is a priori no crowding out effects (see Hall and van Reenen, 2000 for a sur-
vey). Furthermore, direct funding of programs by public agencies allows subsidies to
be targeted towards projects that are perceived to achieve higher social rates of re-
turn. However, given the intricacies of R&D activities and technological policy, pu-
blic funds may end up financing projects with high private returns and thus crowding
out private investment in R&D (see David et al., 2000 for a review of the related em-
pirical literature). But do public subsidies to R&D complement or substitute private
spending on R&D? Given the ambiguous answers offered by the literature, more em-
pirical evidence on the effects of public R&D spending on private performance is ne-
eded. Moreover, as Klette et al. (2000) argue, compared to the size of the budgets and
the current emphasis on technology policy, there has been relatively little effort to
quantitatively evaluate the additionality of R&D subsidies.
Recently a growing literature dealing with regional innovation systems has emer-
ged (see, for example, Acs, 2000; Fornahl and Brenner, 2003) arguing that the regio-
nal dimension is of key importance for technology policy. There are several reasons
to support this view. Firstly, regions differ with regard to their industrial specialisa-
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knowledge spillovers, which play a key role in the innovation process, are often spa-
tially constrained (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). Finally, policy competences and
institutions are partly bound to subnational territories (Cooke et al., 2000). This is
particularly important in countries where a variety of public agencies are involved in
the design and implementation of technology policy. Within the European Union
member states, for instance, EU-level, national and regional R&D subsidies are in
place. Recent contributions show that the objectives of national and regional agencies
differ substantially (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Garcíaand Afcha, 2009) and the eva-
luation of the additionality effects of public R&D subsidies should take into account
this allocational heterogeneity.
The aim of this paper is to provide further evidence on the impact of public R&D
subsidies at the regional level. We estimate, by using a quasi-experimental approach,
the impact of the subsidies granted by the Catalan Public Agency (CIDEM, here-
after)1 on the growth rate of the recipient firms’value added in two steps. Firstly, we
compute the Propensity Score (PS, hereafter) and, by means of matching techniques,
we evaluate the impact of public subsidies by comparing the outcomes of firms
which receive public support with those which do not. Secondly, using the PS obtai-
ned in the first stage in order to detect valid controls, we match each recipient firm
with the one (or more) that it most closely resembles in the control group, and then
we perform standard regressions to measure the impact of the public subsidies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the ratio-
nale for the existence of subsidies devoted to R&D, especially at the regional level.
Section 3 presents the institutional framework of R&D subsidies in Catalonia. Sec-
tion 4 summarises the main methodological issues involved in the empirics of the pa-
per. Section 5 describes the database used. Section 6 presents the main results obtai-
ned. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. Evaluating R&D subsidies: the state of the art
Technology and innovation are key issues in today’s economies, as they form the ba-
sis for competitiveness and long-term growth. From the individual firm’s perspec-
tive, there are incentives to perform R&D activities. On the one hand, successful in-
novations help to strengthen and to consolidate competitive advantages, and on the
other they can represent, for the successful firm, a gain in market power and, there-
fore, supernormal profits for at least some time. The extent to which a firm that
spends significant amounts on R&D can profit from its investments poses a dilemma
for innovation in a market system. The expected profit from investing in R&D is lo-
wer the greater the probability that knowledge, once produced, becomes common to
everyone. Thus, the inability to fully appropriate the profit flows from successful in-
novations reduces private incentives to invest in innovative activities.
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social point of view, then there is a case for public efforts to encourage R&D spen-
ding. Depending on their main objectives, governments can establish different me-
chanisms to promote innovative activities. For instance, public bodies can be di-
rectly involved in the provision of R&D by financing basic research through
systems that facilitate the transmission of knowledge to the private sector. Moreo-
ver, governments can create incentives for an increased provision of private invest-
ment in R&D.
Patents are one of the most important public policy instruments used to reward in-
novating firms. The classical argument for using patents is that by granting a tempo-
rary monopoly right to the innovator, potential innovators have an incentive to devote
resources to R&D. The cost of this policy is that patent holders restrict access to the
innovation during the patent period. Thus, the optimal choice of patent length is for a
social planner a trade off between the benefit of more innovation and the cost asso-
ciated with temporary monopoly power. The seminal work of Nordhaus (1969) is the
main theoretical justification for the existing long and broad degree of patent protec-
tion, showing that the welfare loss of long patents is minimal, while the social cost of
choosing too short a patent life is great. Gallini and Wright (1990) and Matutes et al.
(1996) have showed that extending the length of the patent delays the rate of intro-
duction of new innovations and thus impacts negatively on the diffusion of new dis-
coveries.
Besides the patent system, governments might also subsidize private R&D, di-
rectly or by means of tax incentives. The latter reduce the marginal costs of R&D and
have the virtue of being more neutral in the type of firms and projects funded than ot-
her measures of direct support, letting private business determine the projects and the
amount of R&D (Hall and van Reenen, 2000). This virtue can also be seen as a weak-
ness as it might be socially preferable to steer R&D towards projects with high spillo-
ver effects (Hall, 1993; Mohnen, 2000). Tax incentives are unlikely to be effective in
promoting R&D by high-technology start-up firms or Small and Medium Enterprises
(SME, hereafter): for a tax credit to be effective, a firm must have tax obligations that
the tax credit can be used to satisfy.
Direct public subsidies for private R&D allow governments to target projects with
perceived higher social rates of return. Some theoretical models of R&D policy show
that R&D subsidies can restore incentives to reach efficient allocation when know-
ledge spillovers are the main reason for underinvestment (Blanes and Busom, 2004).
Implementation of a subsidy-based R&D policy, however, may be difficult in prac-
tice given the information asymmetries: the public agency must be able to identify
those R&D projects with higher social returns that are unlikely to be carried out by
private firms in isolation (Socorro, 2007). In this case, there is a risk that govern-
ment-funded R&D will simply crowd-out private investment (David et al., 2000 and
Wallsten, 2000). The danger of such displacement is particularly important because
governments can end up allocating scarce public funds sub-optimally and discoura-
ging the R&D activities of private entities.
Moreover, several contributions from the geography of innovation literature have
highlighted the great geographic concentration of technological activities and the re-
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1999). Besides, innovation systems differ among regions which suggests the use of
policies designed exclusively to deal with specific regional characteristics (Tödtling
and Trippl, 2005; Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008). Consequently, regional govern-
ments have acquired a growing role in the definition and application of technology
policy (Fritsch and Stephan, 2005), and many countries carry out these policies from
a multi-level perspective where regional, national and international agencies are in-
volved in the allocation of R&D subsidies2.
Although this overlapping allocation mechanism calls for the efficient coordina-
tion of national and regional agencies granting R&D subsidies3, recent contributions
using Spanish data have shown that different agencies follow very different policy
objectives. More precisely, regional agencies are oriented towards SMEs and/or tra-
ditional sectors whereas national subsidies tend to reach larger firms already perfor-
ming R&D activities (Blanes and Busom, 2004). Furthermore, having received a re-
gional R&D subsidy has a positive impact on the probability of receiving a national
grant and vice versa (García and Afcha, 2009). To sum up, as Herrera and Nieto
(2008) argue, it is necessary to consider the location of firms in order to eventually
assess the effect of the innovation policy correctly.
The increased importance of regional innovation policy has not been accompa-
nied by an equivalent upsurge in evaluation studies confirming the positive impact of
the actions undertaken on a regional scale. Although some studies take the regional
dimension into account in the concession of R&D subsidies, (Czarnitzki and Fier,
2002; Blanes and Busom, 2004) the literature on the evaluation of regional innova-
tion policy is still scarce and offers little information on the performance of regional
innovation systems.
While studies of the impact of public subsidy programs conducted at the national
level are common and include, among others, Lenihan and Hart (2004), Arvanitis et
al. (2002), Lerner (1999), Wallsten (2000) or Roper et al. (2004), evaluation exerci-
ses conducted at the regional level are less frequent. For instance, Turok (1997) eva-
luates the impact (and effectiveness) of the European Structural Funds in Scotland;
Lenihan (1999; 2004) studies the impact of public subsidies on the Shannon region in
Ireland or Lambrecht and Pirnay (2005) who carry out an evaluation of public sup-
port measures to R&D in the Walloon Region of Belgium.
While varying widely in their geographic scope, what all of the aforementioned
studies have in common is their use of parametric techniques for performing policy
evaluations. However, a non-parametric technique, Propensity Score Matching
(PSM, hereafter), has gained increased popularity in carrying out policy evaluation
exercises. Using PSM to undertake studies at the national level, Almus and Czar-
niztki (2003) look at the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s R&D intensity in Ger-
many, Duguet (2004) analyses the consequences of public subsidies for the private fi-
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portance of public subsidies for R&D in Spain. With Czarniztki and Fier (2002) re-
presenting a notable exception, the PSM technique has, however, scarcely been used
in studies at the regional level.
3. Institutional framework: R&D subsidies in Catalonia
In Spain, the decentralization process that started in the 80’s allowed regional go-
vernments to adopt their own measures for industrial promotion to tackle the peculia-
rities of each regional industrial structure more effectively. In the case of Catalonia,
the industrial structure has been characterized by the importance of SMEs, and a high
degree of productive diversification. Moreover, Catalan industry represents around
25% of Spanish industry and, therefore, its competitive position, as well as the im-
pact of public intervention to promote it, is of particular interest.
In Catalonia, regional industrial policy intervention has been summarized in diffe-
rent plans directed towards overcoming some of its structural weaknesses. For ins-
tance, during the 1993-1996 period there was a plan to improve the competitiveness
of Catalan industry focused on reducing regional disparities, promoting the interna-
tionalization of firms, and the adoption of new technology and R&D. The results ma-
terialized in the strengthening of specialized clusters and in a growing participation
of Catalan firms in international transactions of goods and services, as well as in in-
vestment inflows and outflows.
More recently, industrial policy in Catalonia has been articulated around Innova-
tion Plan for Catalonia 2001-2004, which intended to reinforce the innovative capa-
city of Catalan firms (see Callejón and García-Quevedo, 2000). Apart from this the
Spanish central government has undertaken some actions to promote local industries
through the design of high-priority lines such as the SME Consolidation and Compe-
titiveness Plan 2001-2006, transferring funds to regional governments to manage pu-
blic programs locally, guaranteeing independence in procedures, resolutions and pay-
ments in the application of these programs4. The evaluation of these public programs
to promote industrial innovation is of special interest in determining which measures
have been effective (and to what extent) in the reinforcement of the competitive posi-
tion of Catalan firms.
Public subsidies in Catalonia, as we have mentioned, are managed by CIDEM (all
subsidies analysed in this study are part of the Innovation Plan for Catalonia 2001-
2004). The amount of the subsidies we evaluate is around 8.6 million euros, which
represented, approximately, 66% of CIDEM’s total budget for the year 2000, and
around 0.03% of the Catalan industrial Gross Value Added in that year. Below we
briefly describe the four public programs we evaluate. Table 1 presents a quantitative
description of these programs during the year 2000.
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the optimization and consolidation of firms’ resource management, flexibility, inno-
vation, satisfaction of clients and personnel, and to improve the firm’s impact on the
environment. In addition, it had the aim of supporting the firm’s competitive position
in the market.
Program 2. The main objective of this program was to finance projects aimed at
achieving more competitive products, cost reductions, and increases in quality and
productivity.
Program 3. This program consisted of a package of four subsidies: i) Managerial
cooperation; ii) Promotion of information services; iii) Design and iv) Networks to
support innovative activities. The purposes of this program as a whole was to incre-
ase the competitiveness of firms, promote the rendering of advanced services of ma-
nagerial information; the incorporation, assimilation or application of innovative
technologies and/or innovative design in SMEs.
Program 4. This was a public program oriented towards promoting R&D coope-
ration between firms and technological centres.
Catalonia represents one of the biggest regional innovation systems in Spain, con-
centrating around 23% of total and 26% of private R&D expenditure in the country.
Its total R&D budget represents 1.4% of the regional GDP. Besides these figures, it
was one of the first regions to pursue an autonomous R&D subsidy policy in Spain
and it also attracts a considerable amount of the subsidies granted by the national
agency. Thus, evaluation of the effectiveness of these subsidies is of importance not
only for Catalonia but also for other regions recently designing innovation policies
and granting subsidies.
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Table 1. Public subsidies granted by CIDEM (in the year 2000)
Applications 
received (a)
Applications 
approved (b)
Covering ratio
(%) (b)/(a)
Total amount
(€)
Amount per firm
(€)
Program 1 37 30 81 155,032 5,168
Program 2 1,248 522 42 941,185 1,803
Program 3 515 183 35 6,022,927 32,912
Program 4 142 86 61 1,539,888 17,906
Total 1,942 821 55* 8,659,032 14,447*
* Average. 
It is worth noting that many of the studies mentioned up to this point report that
the firms receiving a public subsidy tend to be more innovative, confirming the addi-
tionality effect of public subsidies. In this study, however, due to lack of data, we
have been unable to include any variables related to firms’R&D activities. Nonethe-
less, it seems clear that innovation plays a role in the determination of the competi-
tive capacity of firms, and consequently in their results. We will therefore use growth
in the firm’s value added as a measure of performance. Furthermore, to keep the sam-
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ned in the four programs previously described.
In the next section we explain the methodology used to analyse the impact of
these subsidies on the performance of firms, while section 5 completes and extends
the explanation of the data base used in the empirical estimations.
4. Methodological issues
The best method for evaluating public programs, such as those presented in the pre-
vious section, is to use “true” or natural experiments based on random assignments as
they offer the strongest foundations for analysing cause and effect relationships (La-
londe, 1986). In experimental designs of this type, units are assigned randomly to
“treatment and control groups”. On average, the units in each group are equivalent
with regard to all their shared characteristics. Thanks to this equivalence, the in-
fluence of external factors that could contribute to the observed results can be elimi-
nated. Hence, any differences in the observed results between the two groups can be
attributed exclusively to the implementation of the public program.
Nevertheless, the adoption of an experimental design based on random assign-
ments for the evaluation of public programs is generally not feasible. Public agen-
cies, for instance, are unable to refuse the concession of grants to eligible companies
and subsidized (treated) and non- subsidized (non-treated) firms often differ in the
characteristics that affect the results of the program (i.e. selection bias).
The evaluation of public programs therefore requires an alternative method, a
quasi-experimental approach which allows us to compare the results between two
groups of companies: those which receive public subsidy (treated firms), and those
that do not (non-treated firms), with the understanding, however, that not all the sub-
sidies are randomly assigned. In other words, there is a need to construct a control
group that has ex-ante the same probability of receiving a public subsidy in such a
way that both treated and non-treated firms can be considered as if they had been ran-
domly assigned.
If we consider receiving public subsidy as being the treatment effect, we can de-
fine the main impact that we wish to capture as the expected effect of treatment for
the treated population, or Average Treatment of the Treated (ATT, hereafter):
[1]
where, Y1 is the outcome for firms which receive public subsidy and Y0 is the out-
come for recipient firms not exposed to the treatment. Finally, Di ∈ {0,1] is an indi-
cator of participation (D = 1 for the treated firms, D = 0 for the non-treated firms).
As we mention above, receiving a public subsidy cannot be considered a comple-
tely random event and, therefore, E (Y0⏐D = 1)is not observable and must be estima-
ted given that that is the counterfactual outcome that participants would experience
on average if they do not participate in the program. To support this, matching econo-
ATT = EY 1 −Y 0 D =1 () = EY 1 D =1 () − EY 0 D =1 ()
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to produce, under certain assumptions, valid estimates of policy impacts6.
Using matching estimators we are then able to build a counterfactual sample of
firms (the control group) by pairing each recipient firm with a non-treated firm. As
Rubin (1977) points out, a necessary assumption here is conditional independence
between outcomes for non-treated firms and program participation, given that some
characteristics (X) are observable. The control group, therefore, is constituted of non-
participant firms whose distribution of observed characteristics is as similar as possi-
ble to that of the treated firms. This requires:
[2]
and guarantees that all treated firms have a counterpart in the control group.
An implementation problem arises when the vector X is highly dimensional, as it
is in our case (see section 5). Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the use of the
probability (a scalar function) of receiving treatment conditional on covariates. This
probability p(X) is the propensity score (PS). The matching method would estimate
the ATT as:
[3]
Eq. [3] is derived from Eq. [1] with the requirement of an adequate balancing of
pre-treatment variables. If this balancing hypothesis is fulfilled, observations with the
same PS must have the same distribution of observable characteristics which are in-
dependent of their treatment status.
Given that the PS is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment
given the pre-treatment characteristics, we estimate a probit model with the covaria-
tes estimation 
[4]
where Φ is the normal function, and h(X) is an initial specification which includes all
the covariates as linear terms (see Greene, 2003 for more details). 
Once we compute the PS, we can use several matching estimators. We construct
the match for each treated firm as a weighted average over the outcomes of non-par-
ticipants, where the weights depend on the distances between estimated PS. The more
Pr D =1X {} =Φ hX () {}
ATT = EE Y 1 D =1,pX () [] − EY 0 D = 0,pX () D =1 () {}
0 < Pr D =1X = x () <1        for   x ∈X
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assumption for identifying some population measures of impact. Third, conditional mean independence:
the outcome for the non-treated group does not determine participation in the program. See Cameron and
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employ four matching alternatives: the Nearest Neighbour estimator (NNM), the Ra-
dius estimator, the Stratification estimator and the Kernel estimator (Becker and
Ichino, 2002)7. With the two groups of firms, “treated” and “non-treated”, we are
now able to perform a first evaluation exercise as defined in Eq. (1), which is to esti-
mate the average treatment of the treated firms.
In a second stage, we use the estimated PS of the first stage to construct various
quasi-experimental control groups8 which when combined with the treatment group
allow us to estimate, through a classic production function regression model, the im-
pact of public subsidies on the performance of firms controlling for several poten-
tially influential factors.
Given the lack of data referring to R&D indicators, our aim is to estimate the va-
riation in the firms’ results, focusing our attention on the effect of public subsidies.
We use a modified Cobb-Douglas production function, where production (Q) is a
function of labour (L), capital (K) and intermediate inputs of production (M), as well
as of the specific effects for each firm (F) and for the j industry (I) where the firm
operates: 
[5]
subtracting intermediate inputs of production (M) from each side of the equation
yields:
[6]
where Vi is the value added of firm i. 
Since we are interested in estimating the contribution of public subsidies to a
change in the value added of firms, we adopt a growth accounting framework. By
first taking the differences in the production function in [6] we obtain the following
relationship: 
[7]
where Eq. [7] presents the growth rate of value added between years 2000 and 2002.
The specific effects for company (F) and sector (I) are also assumed to be fixed in the
growth equation and, therefore, they are not represented in terms of a variable of
change. 
Δt logVi =Δ t logLi +Δ t logKi + F + I j
Vi =Qi − M i = f (Li,Ki,F,I j)
Qi = f (Li,Ki,M i,F,Ij)
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order to check the robustness of the results. Note that this procedure differs from the matching methodo-
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tal number of workers and the logarithm of the value added in the initial year. The
first variable controls for the initial firm size, while the second controls for the initial
levels of competitiveness and positioning in the market. Formally, the estimated
equation is:
[8]
where Δt log Vi is the change in the logarithm of value added, Δt log Li is the change
in the logarithm of the number of workers, Δt log Ki is the change in the logarithm of
capital, log Vi,t-1 is the logarithm of the value added in the initial year, log Li,t-1 is the
logarithm of the number of workers in the initial year, Ij is a set of sectoral dummy
variables9, and, finally, ei is an error term.
To conclude, we introduce the variables related to public subsidies (denoted by T)
to estimate their effects on the growth rate of value added for recipient firms compa-
red with non-recipient firms: 
[9]
T denotes dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm received a subsidy
from any of the above mentioned programs in the year 2000 (treated) and 0 if not
(non-treated).
5. Data
Two main sources of information are used in this paper. The first is the CIDEM data-
base on those firms that received a public subsidy in Catalonia (from which we ob-
tain the treatment group) and the second is the Sistema Anual de Balances Ibéricos
(SABI, hereafter) database which is used to construct the control group. This data-
base is a representative sample of firms in Spain and contains information on the ac-
counts of individual firms. In 2007 it held information on more than one million Spa-
nish firms, of which about 230,000 were located in Catalonia10. We construct our
control group from those firms located in Catalonia that did not apply for public sub-
sidies from the regional agency. Moreover, we complete the CIDEM’s data on reci-
pient firms with the information contained in SABI for those firms.
Δt logVi =β 1Δt logLi +β 2Δt logKi +β 3 logVi,t−1 +β 4 logLi,t−1 + I j +Ti +ei
Δt logVi =β 1Δt logLi +β 2Δt logKi +β 3 logVi,t−1 +β 4 logLi,t−1 + I j +ei
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less than 5% of small firms, representing 31.4% of the overall employment in that category. However, the
SABI covers 31% of firms with more than nine workers, and more than half of the larger firms (55.3%).
These figures show that the sample of firms recorded in the SABI can be considered sufficiently repre-
sentative of the population of Spanish (and Catalan) firms.
06 Duch  19/11/09  12:26  Página 153The SABI database enables us to analyse the behaviour of a very broad sample of
firms, as it contains company information on balance sheets and profit and loss ac-
counts and several economic indicators. With all this information to hand, we are
able to organize the information at the territorial level, to classify firms according to
the NACE-Rev.1 classification, and we can accurately define company size by exa-
mining information concerning the number of employees.
For our study, we collected data from the SABI database from two points in time:
first from 2000, the year in which the subsidy was granted, and second from 2002, in
order to determine if, over time, there exists a significant impact from public subsi-
dies on the main aggregates of firms.
The information required to identify the treatment group was obtained directly
from CIDEM. The total number of applications received by the agency in the year
2000 was 1,942 of which 821 were accepted11. We were able to locate 601 of the suc-
cessful applicants in the SABI database, but unfortunately we were not able to obtain
the relevant information for all of them. Therefore, our study is conducted using 421
firms which received a public subsidy and for which there is complete information in
the SABI database. This gives us a covering ratio (treated firms with all the relevant
information in relation to the total number of treated firms) of 51.3%.
The first step in selecting firms, from those located in Catalonia, that could be
considered eligible for the control group was to eliminate all those companies that re-
ceived a subsidy and all those companies that operate in sectors not represented by
any firm in the agency records (sectors in which firms did not apply for a subsidy).
The result was data for 66,763 companies, these being the set from which we could
select non-treated firms. After a filtering process in which we eliminated those firms
with missing data, we finally had a quasi-experimental control group of 32,011 com-
panies.
The variables used to estimate the PS were selected on the basis of related empiri-
cal evidence and the information available in the SABI database. Previous studies
have identified three groups of relevant variables that can determine the propensity to
obtain a public subsidy12. Table A.1 in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics
from the variables used.
Firstly there are structural variables such as size (L) proxied by the number of
workers; the sector in which a firm operates (Dht is a dummy variable for high tech-
nology manufacturing and Sht for knowledge intensive services); a firm’s age (Ye-
ars), that is, the number of years a firm has been operating in the market;13 location
154 Duch, N., Montolio, D. and Mediavilla, M.
11 We only have information for firms that finally received a public subsidy and not for the rest, i.e. those
firms which unsuccessfully applied for a subsidy.
12 The selection of variables that a priori can determine the propensity to receive public subsidies basi-
cally follows Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Arvanitis et al. (2002), Busom (2000) and Heijs (1999, 2001).
For reasons of space we do not report the arguments behind the introduction of these variables that can be
found in detail in the studies mentioned and in the references therein.
13 We also include a quadratic term for the effect of a firm’s age on its propensity to receive a subsidy
(Y Ye ea ar rs s2 2) in order to capture any possible non-linearities in the relationship, related to the learning curve
effect.
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municipality of Barcelona (central city) and the rest of the Catalan region; a firm’s
property structure (Inin) a variable which takes the value 1 if any shareholder has
more than 25% of the total number of shares; the number of subsidiaries as an indica-
tor of the degree of diversification of a firm (Nsub); and a variable reflecting credit
constraints proxied by the firm’s solvency ratio, (Solv) which also appears in the lite-
rature to be an important determinant of a firm’s propensity to receive a public sub-
sidy. Secondly, market-related variables serve to control for the competitive atmosp-
here in which firms operate. We consider a firm’s exports to be an indicator of
competitiveness measured by dummy variables for whether the firm exports (Exp)
and/or imports (Imp); and a firm’s investment capacity measured by the capital re-
quirements variable (Creq) taken from the SABI database. Thirdly, we include in the
estimation of the propensity to obtain a public subsidy a firm’s capital (K) and inter-
mediate inputs (M) used in production.
6. Main results
With the dataset outlined above, we first estimate a probit model to obtain the PS for
each firm, and using these scores and various matching techniques we calculate the
average effect on the treated firms (ATT) by examining the impact of public subsidies
on a firm’s results. Then, for various control group sizes, we use a classic regression
technique to evaluate the impact of the various public programs aimed at promoting
the competitiveness of firms in Catalonia.
6.1. Determinants for receiving public subsidies
The results of the probit estimation used to calculate the PS are presented in table 2
for three different specifications (denoted SP1, SP2 and SP3, respectively)14.
Briefly, the variables that determine the propensity to be awarded public subsidies
are stable across the three different specifications shown. The variables which prove
to be significant in all specifications are those variables related to a firm’s characte-
ristics. Firstly, the dummy variables that account for high technology manufacturing
(Dht) and knowledge intensive services (Sht) are highly significant, indicating that
firms operating in these sectors have a greater propensity to receive subsidies. Se-
condly, export activity (Exp) is also significant, which indicates that firms facing ex-
ternal competition are more likely to be subsidised in order to reinforce their compe-
titiveness both domestically and internationally. Finally, the number of years that a
firm has been operating (proxy for organizational capacity and experience) is statisti-
cally significant as well. When the square of the number of years term is also consi-
dered our results show an inverted U relationship, indicating that the propensity to re-
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14 Not all the specifications satisfy the requirements to construct the PS. In table 2, therefore, we only
present the variables that satisfy these so-called balancing conditions. For the technical details of this
method, see Becker and Ichino (2002).
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quently decreases.
Table 2. Propensity to receive a public subsidy
SP1 SP2 SP3
Constant  –6.4531 *** –5.7685 *** –6.4821 ***
(–20.36) (–26.27) (–20.16)
Years  0.0452 *** 0.0484 *** 0.0448 ***
(3.26) (3.49) (3.21)
Years2 –0.0006 *** –0.0006 *** –0.0006 ***
(–2.82) (–2.91) (2.78)
VA 0.2718 *** 0.2762 **
(3.77) (2.48)
L –0.1237 0.0561 –0.1485 *
(–1.51) (1.02) (1.75)
K  –0.0192
(–0.23)
M  0.0863 ** 0.0343
(2.48) (0.80)
Inin 0.5138 ** 0.5643 ** 0.5189 **
(2.11) (2.32) (2.13)
Imp  0.2527 0.2341 0.2354
(1.52) (1.40) (1.41)
Exp  0.3281 ** 0.3361 ** 0.3196 **
(2.03) (2.08) (1.98)
Dht  0.6715 *** 0.6973 *** 0.6645 ***
(4.98) (5.18) (4.92)
Sht  0.8624 *** 0.9312 *** 0.8974 ***
(2.99) (3.22) (3.09)
Log–Likelihood –2189.6 –2167.5 –2162.8
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.024 0.026
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent levels, respecti-
vely. Data are for the year 2000. The number of observations is 32,431. The dependent variable is 1 if the company re-
ceives a public subsidy and 0 otherwise. Estimation carried out with a probit model. Inin is 0 if the company has one or
more shareholders with more than 25% of the shares. Imp is 0 if the company does not import. Exp is 0 if the company
does not export. Dht is 0 if the company is not part of a high technology manufacturing sector. Sht is 0 if the company
is not part of a high technology services sector.
From table 2 we can conclude that sectoral differences are highly significant in
determining the propensity of a firm to receive a public subsidy. This indicates that
public subsidies in Catalonia have been mainly directed towards high technology
sectors. This result confirms previous empirical findings for both Spain (Heijs, 1999,
2001; Busom, 2000), as well as other countries (Arvantis et al., 2002; Almus and
Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002), which indicate that certain sectors, most
prominently high-tech, participate more actively in public programs than others.
Moreover, while structural variables, such as a firm’s size (L) and the indepen-
dence indicator (Inin), influence its propensity to obtain a public subsidy, location
156 Duch, N., Montolio, D. and Mediavilla, M.
06 Duch  19/11/09  12:26  Página 156and credit constraints do not appear to have an impact. For this reason, we do not in-
clude the latter variables in the determination of the PS.
In the case of market-related variables, a firm’s investment capacity seems to have
no impact on its propensity to receive an R&D subsidy, while in the case of capital
(K) and intermediate inputs (M) of production, their relevance is found to be small
and not very significant. For instance, capital only enters into SP3, and is not signifi-
cant, while intermediate inputs are only significant in SP2.
Size, proxied by the number of employees, is not significant in the first two speci-
fications, but in the third we find it to have a negative and significant influence on the
PS. It seems, then, that SMEs do receive public subsidies with a greater frequency
than big firms. This finding contradicts usual reports for this variable both in the Spa-
nish case (Fernández et al., 1996; Heijs, 1999, 2001) as well as in the cases of other
countries (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002).
6.2. The effects of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: 
the first-stage
After analysing and controlling for observable differences between groups of firms,
we then estimate the average effect of public subsidies on the value added growth
rate of the treated firms. Our results for the third specification (SP3 in table 2) pre-
sented in the previous section are summarized in table 315.
In order to estimate the average effect of the treatment, we use an area of common
support, which enables us to eliminate those firms that present poor matching. As
shown in figure 1 the observations outside the overlapping area between the two dis-
tributions are left out of the common support area. This procedure guarantees that
both treated and non-treated units have the same distribution of observable characte-
ristics, making them independent of the treatment status. This restriction improves
our estimation of the ATT without reducing the sample by too much.
When calculating the ATT, the sample of firms varies according to the proposed
estimator, and as companies can never be identical the size of the control group is
non-homogeneous. Moreover, as the requirements that have to be met when calcula-
ting the different estimators vary, the number of firms in the treatment group also va-
ries. Thus, the number of firms receiving a subsidy is 417 (or 416 in the case of the
Radius estimator), with the control group oscillating between 414 at the lowest (Nea-
rest Neighbour estimators) and 30,603 at the highest (Stratification and Kernel esti-
mators).
Table 3 shows that the parameters obtained by means of nearest neighbour esti-
mators, NNM(1) and NNM(2), are not statistically significant16. Significant estima-
tions show that treated firms present value added growth rates that are 3.5% higher in
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15 The estimations for SP1 and SP2 are presented in tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.
16 Nearest Neighbour estimator (NNM) consists of taking each treated unit and searching for the control
unit with the closest PS. It seems clear that some of these matches are poor because for some treated units
the nearest neighbour may have a very different PS and, nevertheless, contribute to the estimation of the
treatment effect independently of this difference.
06 Duch  19/11/09  12:26  Página 157the case of the Kernel estimator, 4.4% higher with the radius estimator, and 5.6% hig-
her using the stratification estimator than non-treated firms. It seems, therefore, that
the inclusion of more companies increases the statistical significance of the estima-
tors (bearing in mind, of course, that the requirements for the construction of the con-
trol group differ according to the estimator used).
Table 3. Average effect of subsidies on firm’s performance for SP3
t-statistic Firms
ATT A B T C
NNM (1)  0.017 0.700 0.606 417 414
NNM (2)  0.011 0.436 0.439 417 414
Radius 0.044 2.307 *** 2.246 *** 416 10,316
Stratification 0.056 - 3.091 *** 417 30,603
Kernel 0.035 - 2.034 *** 417 30,603
A– t-statistic (analytic); B – t-statistic (bootstrapping ); T – Number of Treated firms; C – Number of Control firms; (1)
Nearest neighbor with random selection; (2) Nearest neighbor with identical weights. *, * * and *** indicate statistical
significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent levels, respectively.
These results appear robust, as the estimators obtained for the other specifications
considered in table 2 to obtain the PS confirm (see appendix). Effectively, nearest
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Figure 1. Box-Plot of treatment and control distributions of predicted PS
(using specification 3 in table 2)
Note that the overlapping PS in both groups (box) is the area of common support.
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tors the parameters present a variation ranging from 3.5% in the case of the Kernel
estimator and 5.7% when the stratification estimator is used in SP1 (table A.1) and
2.5% and 4.4% respectively in SP2 (table A.2). Moreover, we always find the radius
estimator lies somewhere between these two extremes. To sum up, the empirical evi-
dence shows that the subsidies granted by the regional agency have a positive effect
on the value added growth rate of the firms that receive them.
6.3. The impact of public subsidies on value added growth: 
the second-stage
The ATT results of the previous section show that, on average, firms that receive sub-
sidies show a faster value added growth rate. To what extent is this result robust? In
this section, we perform a new matching exercise in order to construct additional
control groups and rely on classic regression techniques that allow a wide set of co-
variates to be taken into account, as suggested by Ho et al. (2007). We proceed by
first separating firms by sector and then, to construct the control group, we match up
the most similar firms within each sector according to the PS. We perform this mat-
ching on three levels:
i) 1:1 matching: we match a firm receiving a subsidy with the most similar firm
from the same sector according to the PS.
ii) 1:2 matching: for each treated firm we identify the two most similar firms in
the same sector.
iii) 1:5 matching: we identify five control firms for each treated unit, always se-
lecting from the same sector of activity.
We construct these three different control groups in order to determine the thres-
hold of similarity between treated and non-treated units. The hypothesis we formu-
late is that if there is no average treatment effect differential between the treated unit
and its most equal control group (that is, with a 1:1 matching), then both groups are
so similar that non-treated firms will probably have an equal performance to treated
firms17. This holds, however, only in the event of a significant average effect diffe-
rential with the larger control groups (that is, with a 1:5 matching). If there are no
average effect differentials of public subsidies between the treated group and the con-
trol group on the 1:5 level, then public programs to promote a firms’competitiveness
could be seen as ineffective.
As table 4 shows, we observe that the change in the number of employees (ΔL),
the change in the capital stock (ΔK), along with the value added (VA t t- -1 1) and the num-
ber of employees (Lt t- -1 1) both for the initial year are highly significant. The variables
that capture the variation in the quantities of the productive factors (K and L) are po-
sitively related to the value added growth rate of firms. In addition, as we successi-
vely use control groups containing more firms, the estimated parameters remain
constant as the number of observations increases.
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firms) financed by private sources in order to maintain their competitiveness.
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riod and firms with a lower value added in the initial period grew rapidly. This result
points towards the idea that once firms have reached a certain level of value added, it
is more difficult to find mechanisms which allow high growth rates to be maintained.
When using all three control group sizes, we obtain a significant effect for the va-
riable that indicates whether a firm receives a public subsidy or not (T). This result is
highly robust in the three sets of estimations presented. When we consider a narrow
control group, in which each firm is matched to its most similar control, public subsi-
dies are significant with an elasticity of around 10%. When we expand the control
group to consider more than one match per firm, 1:2 and 1:5 respectively, we find
that public subsidies are statistically significant and that they have a positive impact
on the determination of differential growth in value added for recipient firms in the
period under analysis.
Table 4. Impact of public subsidies on value added growth
Control group
(1:1) (1:2) (1:5)
Constant 1.1600 *** 1.3362 *** 1.4319 ***
(11.89) (16.62) (25.03)
ΔL 0.5407 *** 0.5560 *** 0.5205 *** 
(16.37) (20.86) (28.11)
ΔK 0.3334 *** 0.2943 *** 0.3227 ***
(10.47) (11.76) (17.86)
Lt–1 0.2889 *** 0.3221 *** 0.3471 ***
(11.03) (14.61) (22.04)
VAt–1 –0.3003 *** –0.3446 *** –0.3683 ***
(–12.24) (–16.9) (–25.28)
Inin  –0.0367 –0.0015 0.0131
(–0.37) (–0.12) (0.14)
Nsub  0.017 0.0239 * 0.0328 ***
(1.30) (1.99) (3.29)
Loc  0.0304 0.0359 0.0861 ***
(0.65) (0.86) (2.72)
Exp  0.0138 0.0263 0.1584 ***
(0.22) (0.43) (3.21)
Dht  0.0433 0.0303 0.0096
(1.11) (0.94) (0.42)
Sht  –0.0195 –0.0458 –0.0458
(–0.24) (–0.68) (–0.96)
T 0.1025 *** 0.1325 *** 0.1011 ***
(2.70) (4.10) (3.79)
N 826 1,239 2,478
F 56.13 92.77 184.71
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.449 0.449
Note: t–statistic in parentheses. *, * * and *** indicate statistical significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent levels, respectively.
The dependent variable is value added growth between 2000 and 2002. Estimates carried out by means of ordinary least
squares. Inin is 0 if the companies have one or more shareholders with more than 25% of the shares. Loc is 0 if the com-
pany is located outside the municipality of Barcelona. Exp is 0 if the company does not export. Dht is 0 if the company is
not part of a high technology manufacturing sector. Sht is 0 if the company is not part of a high technology services sector.
T is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the firm did not receive a subsidy.
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a firm nor its market-related variables are significant when explaining value added
growth for the 1:1 and 1:2 control groups18. Only when the control group is increased
to a 1:5 relationship do these variables appear significant. The variables concerned
are, specifically, the number of subsidiaries (Nsub), defined as a measure of differen-
tiation, which indicates that diversified firms grow faster, location (Loc) which
shows that firms in the municipality of Barcelona also grow faster and, finally, the
exports variable (Exp) which indicates that exporting firms also have higher growth
rates for value added. Finally, it is worth noting that the dummy variables controlling
for high technology manufacturing and knowledge intensive services are not signifi-
cant, indicating that there is no differential growth rates for these two groups of firms.
Public subsidies, therefore, can be seen to have a positive and significant impact on
the value added growth of the firms that receive them. 
Given that the objective of subsidies is the promotion of quality, R&D activities,
managerial information services and the strengthening of managerial cooperation
between firms as a mechanism for the enhancement of their competitiveness and,
hence, market positioning and results, we can verify that the firms which receive a
subsidy become more dynamic. This is something which becomes apparent when
their growth differential is compared with firms which did not receive a subsidy.
Our results are in line with those of Turok (1997) who detects a significant impact
of structural funds on SMEs employment and turnover in Scotland and opposed to
those of Lambrecht and Pirnay (2005) who do not find any relevant effect of subsidi-
zed private external advisors to SMEs on job creation, turnover or financial indica-
tors in the Walloon region of Belgium. Nevertheless, these results should be interpre-
ted with care given that the link between R&D subsidies and value added growth is
not always clear. In other words, even if it seems reasonable to assume that a firm
that is granted a subsidy to pursue a specific innovation project can improve its com-
petitiveness and, hence, could be generating more value added, there might be other
explanations that we cannot control for. For instance, a treated firm could simultane-
ously be receiving public money from the national agency or even EU-level funds or
could be cooperating with other firms or technological centres, thus hiding the real
effect of the regional subsidy. In addition, firms can be strengthening their competi-
tive position by means of strategies that are not technological activities.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we carry out a two-stage quasi-experimental procedure to evaluate the
impact of regional public subsidies for R&D. Firstly, the quasi-experiment performed
allows us to gain external validity for the results obtained (they can be generalized).
Secondly, the two-stage approach helps to increase the internal validity of the estima-
tions (to overcome some of the drawbacks of matching techniques).
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ments necessary for a counterfactual design based on the construction of a control
group which makes the accurate measurement of the effects of such subsidies
possible.
To do this the Propensity Score Matching methodology is used to build up a con-
trol group comprised of firms which do not receive a subsidy, but which can be con-
sidered as the closest matches to their treated, or recipient, counterparts. This method
allows us to evaluate the impact of public subsidies through the Average Treatment of
the Treated.
The propensity scores obtained here indicate that variables such as age, sector (es-
pecially high-tech), property structure, and the export activity of firms positively af-
fect a firm’s propensity to receive a public subsidy, and that the results seem to be ro-
bust to different specifications. Using the propensity scores in an initial attempt to
estimate the effects of public subsidies, we find that, on average, the firms which re-
ceived a subsidy in the year 2000 recorded a higher growth rate of value added du-
ring the period 2000-2002.
Furthermore, in a second step, we estimate a production function at the firm level
for the treatment and control groups (the latter we create with the estimated PS), and
find that the public subsidies seem to have a positive impact on the growth rate of the
value added for recipient firms. This positive and significant impact, bearing in mind
the construction of the control groups, seems to suggest that the results are robust and
that, indeed, public subsidies promote growth differentials between treated and non-
treated firms.
These conclusions must be framed within a comprehensive evaluation of the sub-
sidies for the promotion of local firms. Although the rigorous approach which we
present here yields credible estimates of program impacts, in the absence of random
experiments, causality can always be called into question, particularly given potential
selection bias. While the construction of the control group and the specification of the
model that we use in this evaluation helps to minimize potential bias, future efforts
need to address this problem more exhaustively. The explicit modelling of the selec-
tion process using longitudinal data awaits further attempts by those interested in me-
asuring the impact of public subsidy programs.
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Table A.1. Summary of statistics
Treated Non-treated
test Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
L (employees) * 25.6 36.7 1 465 29.6 169.8 1 15.003
K (1000’s €) * 3,759.2 6,252.2 72.4 57,809.1 6,499.8 10,8470.3 3.3 11,400,000
M (1000’s €) * 2,353.5 4,209.7 0 43,262.7 3,317.8 45,873.1 0 5,024,350
Dht (dummy) 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1
Sht (dummy) 0.0 0.2 0 1 0.0 0.1 0 1
Years (number) 19.0 10.9 5 71 16.3 10.2 5 107
Loc (dummy) * 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.1 0.4 0 1
Inin (dummy) 0.0 0.2 0 1 0.0 0.1 0 1
Nsub (number) * 0.4 1.6 0 17 0.3 2.3 0 226
Solv (ratio) * 30.3 22.8 –130.6 90 28.9 32.1 –948.8 100
Exp (dummy) 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.1 0.2 0 1
Imp (dummy) 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1
Creq (ratio) * 44.8 127.8 –93.4 952 45.9 134.8 -99.9 996
N 421 32,011
* Indicates that the mean of the treated and non-treated group are not statistically different at a 99% level of signifi-
cance (performed with a t-test for the continuous variables and with a z-test for the dummy variables). 
Table A.2. Average effect of subsidies on firm’s performance for SP1
t-statistic Firms
ATT
AB T C
NNM (1)  0.011 0.446 0.434 421 420
NNM (2)  0.002 0.070 0.081 421 420
Radius 0.045 2.388*** 2.297*** 420 11,089
Stratification 0.057 - 2.527*** 421 31,309
Kernel 0.035 - 1.946** 421 31,309
A– t-statistic (analytic); B – t-statistic (bootstrapping ); T – Number of Treated firms; C – Number of Control firms; (1)
Nearest neighbor with random selection; (2) Nearest neighbor with identical weights. *, * * and *** indicate statistical
significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent levels, respectively. 
Table A.3. Average effect of subsidies on firm’s performance for SP2
t-statistic Firms
ATT
AB T C
NNM (1)  –0.007 –0.257 –0.274 417 417
NNM (2)  –0.005 –0.196 –0.230 417 417
Radius 0.034 1.695* 1.907** 415 11,237
Stratification 0.044 2.346*** 2.137*** 417 30,704
Kernel 0.025 - 1.344 417 30,704
A– t-statistic (analytic); B – t-statistic (bootstrapping ); T – Number of Treated firms; C – Number of Control firms; (1)
Nearest neighbor with random selection; (2) Nearest neighbor with identical weights. *, * * and *** indicate statistical
significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent levels, respectively. 
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